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Notes
Supreme Court Politics and Life Tenure: A
Comparative Inquiry
KEVIN COSTELLO†
While the process of nominating and confirming justices to the U.S. Supreme Court has always
been political in nature, the three most recent nominations of Merrick Garland, Neil Gorsuch,
and Brett Kavanaugh illustrate the extent to which the confirmation process has become
especially partisan. Whereas the nominations of Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg each
received broad, bipartisan support, no nominee since Stephen Breyer has received more than
eighty votes in the Senate. Furthermore, for the first time since 2004, the economy is not the
political issue that voters are most likely to consider “very important;” that designation now
belongs to the composition of the Supreme Court.
To ease the high-stakes, partisan attitudes that currently define Supreme Court confirmations,
this Note advocates for a 28th Amendment, limiting Supreme Court tenure to eighteen-year terms.
In doing so, it considers the experiences of countries that have similar confirmation processes but
place limits on judicial tenure. Broadly speaking, there are two types of limits on judicial tenure.
The first approach is that of a mandatory retirement age, which Brazil adopted in 1891. Brazil’s
experience, which has been characterized by massive disparities in appointment power among
the different presidents, cautions against such an approach. The second approach is that of a
“term of years” limit. Mexico adopted fifteen-year term limits in 1994, and the results have
generally been encouraging. However, like Brazil, there remains some disparity among various
Mexican presidents in their appointment power, fueled in part by the limits placed on judicial
tenure. This disparity could be remedied by adopting the eighteen-year proposal advocated by
Professors Steven Calabresi and James Lindgren, as opposed to fifteen-year terms, as this would
guarantee each president at least two opportunities to nominate a Justice.

† J.D. Candidate 2020, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Senior Symposium Editor,
Hastings Law Journal. I would like to thank Professor Radhika Rao, whose fascinating seminar in Comparative
Constitutional Law provided the inspiration for this Note. I would also like to thank the Hastings Law Journal
Notes team for their hard work and valuable feedback; I am particularly grateful to Andrew Klair, Bert Lathrop,
and Alicia Ginsberg, all of whom have been correcting my (many) mistakes since 2017, when we were 1Ls in
Manuel Inn. Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their unyielding support through the vicissitudes of
law school life.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, there seems to be broad agreement that political
partisanship has damaged the Supreme Court confirmation process.1
Historically, the judiciary has been regarded as the “least dangerous” branch of
the federal government.2 In the past, this understanding has afforded nominees
a certain degree of insulation from the political process.3 This is not to say that
the Senate has historically been unduly deferential to the president’s
nominations or that the nomination process has never been political.4 However,
the “bipartisan spirit” with which the Senate treated the nominations of Antonin
Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg has largely faded in the twenty-first century.5
In fact, no Supreme Court nominee has received eighty votes in the Senate since
Stephen Breyer’s confirmation in 1994.6 The trend towards more “hyperpartisan” confirmation battles is perhaps best illustrated by the three most recent
Supreme Court nominations.7
In the last year of his second term, President Barack Obama nominated
Merrick Garland to the Court after Justice Scalia’s death.8 Garland was, by all
accounts, “well-qualified” for the job.9 Accordingly, when Senate Majority
1. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381,
381–82 (2010) (“Conventional wisdom says that the confirmation process for Supreme Court Justices is now
terribly broken. . . . The common refrain is that ‘if only we could get back to the way we did things in the past,
the process would be so much better.’”).
2. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
3. See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Choosing Justices: How Presidents Decide, 26 J.L. & POL. 425, 488–89
(2011) (“There were no hearings to consider the nominations of Byrnes, Rutledge and Burton in the 1940s and
1950s; the Senate spent only one day and between 23 and 58 pages of hearings on the nominations of Minton,
Whittaker, Byron White[,] and Fortas (1965). Even the nominations of Burger in 1969 and Blackmun in 1970
required a single day and only 116 and 134 pages respectively.”).
4. See, e.g., Andrew Glass, Senate Rejects Chief Justice Nominee, Dec. 15, 1795, POLITICO (Dec. 15,
2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/senate-rejects-chief-justice-nominee-dec-15-1795232510 (discussing the Federalist-dominated Senate’s rejection of President Washington’s nomination of John
Rutledge for the position of Chief Justice, motivated in large part by Rutledge’s opposition to the Jay Treaty).
5. Mel Leonor, Ginsburg Calls for Return of “Bipartisan Spirit” to Judicial Confirmations, POLITICO
(May
21,
2018),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/21/ruth-bader-ginsburg-bipartisan-judicialconfirmations-601835.
6. Stephen Breyer was confirmed in 1997 by a vote of eighty-seven to nine. See Supreme Court
Nominations (Present–1789), U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourt
Nominations1789present.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). John Roberts was confirmed in 2005 by a vote of
seventy-eight to twenty-two. Id. Harriet Miers did not receive a vote. Id. Samuel Alito was confirmed in 2006
by a vote of fifty-eight to forty-two. Id. Sonia Sotomayor was confirmed in 2009 by a vote of sixty-eight to
thirty-one. Id. Elena Kagan was confirmed in 2010 by a vote of sixty-three to thirty-seven. Merrick Garland did
not receive a vote. Id. Neil Gorsuch was confirmed in 2017 by a vote of fifty-four to forty-five. Id. Brett
Kavanaugh was confirmed in 2018 by a vote of fifty to forty-eight. Id.
7. See generally Jessica Yarvin & Daniel Bush, Is the Hyper-Partisan Supreme Court Confirmation
Process “The New Normal?,” PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 13, 2018, 4:51 PM), https://www.pbs.org/
newshour/nation/is-the-hyper-partisan-supreme-court-confirmation-process-the-new-normal.
8. Michael D. Shear et al., Obama Chooses Merrick Garland for Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/us/politics/obama-supreme-court-nominee.html.
9. KAROL CORBIN WALKER, CHAIR, ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE FED. JUDICIARY, STATEMENT OF
WALKER CONCERNING THE NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE MERRICK B. GARLAND TO BE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
OF
THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/
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Leader Mitch McConnell announced that the Senate would not hold
confirmation hearings for Garland, his explanation was strictly political.10
McConnell never raised objections to Garland’s qualifications, temperament, or
judicial philosophy; instead, he expressed a preference for “let[ting] the
American people decide,” as opposed to a “lame duck President.”11 In other
words, McConnell explicitly rejected the notion that the confirmation process is
beyond the scope of partisan politics. Garland never received a hearing or vote,
and his nomination expired at the end of President Obama’s second term.12
When President Donald Trump nominated Neil Gorsuch to the same seat,
virtually all parties acknowledged that Gorsuch, like Garland, was eminently
qualified for the position.13 However, Senate Democrats, embittered by the
Republicans’ treatment of Garland, voted overwhelmingly against the nominee,
and the final vote to confirm Gorsuch (fifty-four to forty-five) fell largely along
party lines.14
Finally, when President Trump nominated Brett Kavanaugh to the Court to
replace Justice Anthony Kennedy who had retired, the confirmation process was
partisan from the outset, both with respect to Kavanaugh’s jurisprudence and to
the availability of certain documents from Kavanagh’s tenure in the Bush
Administration.15 However, the process became more political still after
Christine Blasey Ford came forward with an allegation that Kavanaugh had
sexually assaulted her in high school.16 After hearing testimony from Ford and
Kavanaugh and opening a second background check on the allegations,17 the
content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2016jun21_garlandstatement.authcheckdam.pdf (rating Merrick Garland
“Well Qualified” to serve on the Supreme Court).
10. Amita Kelly, McConnell: Blocking Supreme Court Nomination “About a Principle, Not a Person,”
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 16, 2016, 12:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/03/16/470664561/mcconnellblocking-supreme-court-nomination-about-a-principle-not-a-person.
11. Id.
12. See Amy Howe, Garland Nomination Officially Expires, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 3, 2017, 6:47 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/garland-nomination-officially-expires.
13. NANCY SCOTT DEGAN, CHAIR, ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE FED. JUDICIARY, STATEMENT OF
DEGAN CONCERNING THE NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE NEIL GORSUCH TO BE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
uncategorized/GAO/Gorsuch%20Statement%20submitted%203%2019%202017F.authcheckdam.pdf (rating
Neil Gorsuch “Well Qualified” to serve on the Supreme Court).
14. Roll Call Vote 115th Congress—1st Session, SENATE.GOV, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/
LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115&session=1&vote=00111 (last visited Apr. 15, 2020)
(showing a summary of the nomination vote for Justice Neil M. Gorsuch).
15. See Michael D. Shear et al., Kavanaugh Ducks Questions on Presidential Powers and Subpoenas, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-hearing.html; see also
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White House Withholds 100,000 Pages of Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s Records, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/01/us/politics/kavanaugh-records.html.
16. See Robert Barnes et al., Acrimony, Resolve After Kavanaugh and Ford Testify with Nomination
Hanging in the Balance, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.adn.com/nationworld/2018/09/28/acrimony-resolve-after-kavanaugh-and-ford-testimony-as-nomination-hangs-in-balance
(“The warring accounts from Kavanaugh and his accuser . . . gripped the country and intensified what will be
one of the most fraught confirmation votes in history.”).
17. See Noor Wazwaz et al., Trump Orders Limited FBI Investigation to Supplement Kavanaugh
Background
Check,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(Sept.
28,
2018,
7:55
AM),
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Senate ultimately voted to confirm Kavanaugh, this time by an almost entirely
party-line vote of fifty to forty-eight.18 The process energized both Republicans
and Democrats, and pundits and analysts quickly began to speculate as to how
the “Kavanaugh effect” would impact voter turnout in the upcoming midterm
elections.19 In each of these instances, the Supreme Court confirmation process
has functioned as a political battleground between left and right, and in the
current political climate, this seems unlikely to change, absent some procedural
reform.
There is no shortage of explanations as to how we arrived here. Democrats
sometimes cast blame on the Republicans’ treatment of Merrick Garland in
2016.20 Republicans point instead to the Democrats’ treatment of Robert Bork
in 1987.21 This Note takes no opinion as to how the confirmation process became
so polarized. Instead, it begins with the assumption that political polarization has
fundamentally changed how the confirmation process works and that this change
has been for the worse. This is not to say that the Senate should confirm every
candidate that the president nominates, or that the nominee’s ideology is not a
relevant factor in the Senate’s evaluation. To the contrary, the Senate’s role of
providing advice and consent is an important check on the president, and it
would be highly undesirable for a president concerned only with judicial
outcomes to have free reign in appointing like-minded justices.
However, confirmation hearings need not be strictly political battles, and
because the Court is primarily concerned with the daunting task of interpreting
federal law and the Constitution,22 the nominee’s qualifications and character

https://www.npr.org/2018/09/28/652486413/judiciary-committee-set-to-vote-on-kavanaugh-friday-with-eyeson-undecided-jeff.
18. Roll Call Vote 115th Congress—2nd Session, SENATE.GOV, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/
LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115&session=2&vote=00223#top (last visited Apr. 15,
2020) (showing a summary of the nomination vote for Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh).
19. Compare John Bowden, Priebus: Republican Voters Energized by “Kavanaugh Effect,” HILL (Oct.
14, 2018, 7:01 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows/411282-priebus-republican-votersenergized-by-kavanaugh-effect (“Former White House chief of staff Reince Preibus said Sunday that Brett
Kavanaugh’s successful nomination to the Supreme Court . . . energized Republican-leaning voters and will
boost turnout in next month’s midterm elections.”), with Megan Keller, Poll: “Kavanaugh Effect” Spurs More
to
Vote
Democrat
than
Republican,
HILL
(Oct.
24,
2018,
10:32
AM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/412905-poll-kavanaugh-effect-spurs-slightly-more-people-tovote-democrat (“The brutal battle over Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation has spurred more
people to vote Democrat than Republican, according to a new poll.”).
20. See Jonathan Capehart, McConnell, not Obama, Is Politicizing the Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB. (Mar.
17, 2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-mitch-mcconnell-obama-supremecourt-merrick-garland-20160317-story.html (arguing that Senate Republicans were wrongfully politicizing
Garland’s nomination).
21. See Kevin D. Williamson, Your Rules, Democrats, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 15, 2016, 3:35 PM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/democrats-showed-us-how-and-why-block-supreme-court-nominees/
(arguing that the Senate’s rejection of Robert Bork’s nomination constituted “the arrival of Supreme Court
confirmation hearings as bare-knuckle political brawls.”).
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority.”).

COSTELLO-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1158

5/10/20 3:45 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1153

ought to be emphasized in the Senate’s evaluation. Unfortunately, the country’s
divisive political climate renders it unlikely that the Senate will organically
change its approach to evaluating nominees. On the political right, for example,
Senate Republicans refused to give Judge Garland a hearing, despite his
reputation for being a judicial moderate and his “penchant for judicial restraint,”
a trait often associated with conservative jurists.23 Their opposition, of course,
had little to do with Garland and everything to do with the fact that it was
President Obama who had nominated him.24 On the political left, Democratic
strategists “vowed a fierce battle” against President Trump’s replacement for
Justice Kennedy just days after Kennedy announced his retirement,25 with at
least one Senate Democrat announcing her opposition to the nominee “twelve
days before anyone knew” who the nominee would be.26 It is difficult to untangle
these examples of hyper-partisan Supreme Court politics from the polling data:
in 2018, seventy-six percent of voters deemed “Supreme Court appointments” a
“very important” issue, which was more than any other issue.27 For context, the
issue most deemed “very important” to voters has been “the economy” in every
year since 2004.28 Furthermore, the partisan gap in how Americans view the
Supreme Court is “among the widest in two decades.”29 In short, recent history
indicates that our Supreme Court politics have become increasingly polarized.
A change in the structure of the confirmation process may be necessary in order
to fix this problem. More to the point, drawing on the experiences of other
countries that have successfully implemented limited tenure, this Note

23. Timothy Noah & Brian Mahoney, How Liberal Is Merrick Garland?, POLITICO (Mar. 16, 2016, 7:52
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/supreme-court-merrick-garland-220904.
24. Ron Elving, What Happened with Merrick Garland in 2016 and Why It Matters Now, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (June 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-merrickgarland-in-2016-and-why-it-matters-now?utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=
npr&utm_term=nprnews&utm_content=20180629&fbclid=IwAR1313vggSduDaHbxS7H6gSeDdjrGlOF68Zu
5VMXggp2RImrXiaDgiOf61k (explaining that after Justice Scalia died in 2016, Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell “looked Barack Obama in the eye and . . . said, ‘Mr. President, you will not fill the Supreme Court
vacancy.’”).
25. Michael D. Shear & Thomas Kaplan, Political War Over Replacing Kennedy on Supreme Court Is
Underway, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/us/politics/trump-supremecourt-kennedy.html.
26. See Thomas Jipping, The Truth About Democrats’ Opposition to Brett Kavanaugh, NAT’L REV. (Sept.
12, 2018, 5:44 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-courtnomination-democrat-opposition.
27. Voter Enthusiasm at Record High in Nationalized Midterm Environment, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 26,
2018),
https://www.people-press.org/2018/09/26/voter-enthusiasm-at-record-high-in-nationalized-midtermenvironment.
28. Grace Sparks, Supreme Court Is Voters’ Most “Very Important” Issue, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/26/politics/important-issue-vote-pew-supreme-court/index.html (last updated
Sept. 26, 2018, 6:11 PM).
29. Bruce Drake & John Gramlich, 5 Facts About the Supreme Court, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/07/5-facts-about-the-supreme-court/ (explaining that seventyfive percent of Republicans view the Supreme Court favorably, but only forty-nine percent of Democrats view
the Court favorably).
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ultimately advocates the adoption of a Twenty-Eighth Amendment, limiting
tenure for Supreme Court justices to eighteen-year terms.
Part I provides a brief overview of the Framers’ reasons for choosing “good
behavior” tenure for Article III judges, including Supreme Court justices. Part II
situates the United States as one of the only countries in the modern world that
gives life tenure to the judges on its court of last resort, emphasizing the unique
risks inherent in life tenure for judges who pass on constitutional questions.
Then, having established the prospective benefits of a reduction in Supreme
Court tenure and the comparative rarity of life tenure, Part III examines what
tenure limits look like in practice. First, it examines mandatory retirement age
as a method for limiting tenure. Brazil will be the primary case study, given that
its judicial selection process is almost perfectly analogous to that of the United
States, although it will also examine Australia to illustrate the extent to which
mandatory retirement age can yield shorter terms for judges. Next, Part III will
examine the “term of years” approach as a second method for reducing judicial
tenure. The case study here will be Mexico, which exemplifies a moderately
successful implementation of “term of years” tenure limits, but also highlights
how tenure limits can facilitate arbitrary disparities in Presidential appointment
power. This disparity, I shall argue, can be mitigated with staggered, 18-year
judicial terms.
I. A STRONG AND INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF LIFE
TENURE
The current practice for federal judicial tenure in the United States is rooted
in Article III of the Constitution, which provides that “judges, both of the
supreme court and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good
behavior.”30 Absent impeachment, this affords life tenure to all federal judges.31
A. “GOOD BEHAVIOR” TENURE AS A RESPONSE TO BRITAIN’S “AT WILL”
TENURE
Article III’s “good behavior” approach arose as a reaction to a series of
changes in the British judicial appointment process, wherein judges served not
during “good behavior” but rather “at [the] pleasure” of the Crown.32
Historically, the British had used “good behavior” tenure for judges, and when
King George III shifted from a “good behavior” system to an “at pleasure”
system, the American colonists expressed their dissatisfaction with that change
in the Declaration of Independence. One of the grievances listed in the
Declaration was that King George III had made “[j]udges dependent on his Will
alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their

30. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
31. Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 540
(2018).
32. John V. Orth, Who Judges the Judges?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1245, 1249 (2005).
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salaries.”33 To protect the judiciary against this sort of undue influence by the
executive branch, the Framers reinstituted “good behavior” tenure protection for
Article III judges.34 This way, judges would be relatively insulated from political
pressures, but Congress could still remove judges for cause in cases of egregious
misconduct through the impeachment process.35 The Framers’ system makes
sense as a response to George III’s encroachments upon the British judiciary,
and while the political branches are often critical of the Supreme Court’s
decisions, their general deference to the authority of Article III is evidence that
the Framers were successful in creating what they had intended: a politically
independent judiciary. However, by adopting “good behavior” tenure protection
as the means of securing a politically independent judiciary, the Framers also
vested the individual members of the judiciary with immense power to interpret
the laws and Constitution of the United States.
B. LONGER TERMS: AVERAGE TENURE FROM THE FRAMERS TO TODAY
The antifederalist Brutus, concerned by this immense power concentrated
in federal judges, argued that “[unchecked] power in the judicial, will enable
[judges] to mould the government, into almost any shape they please.”36 This
certainly played a role in the antifederalists’ opposition to life tenure for federal
judges.37 The federalist response to this sort of argument is summed up well by
Alexander Hamilton, writing as Publius in Federalist 78: a “temporary duration
in office,” as opposed to the “good behavior” model enshrined in Article III,
would “naturally discourage” those with “sufficient skill in the laws to qualify
them for the stations of judges” from “quitting a lucrative line of practice to
accept a seat on the bench.”38 This is a strong argument, and if one could only
select between “good behavior” tenure and the tenure limits that govern the
political branches,39 the “good behavior” tenure model seems to be the better
option. Brutus’s argument was further weakened because Justices did not serve
particularly long terms at the beginning of the Republic: average tenure on the
Supreme Court from 1789 to 1820 was only seven and a half years.40 Because
average tenure was so short, many of the early justices had less of an opportunity
to “mould the government” as they wished. This is not to say that many of the
Federalist Justices’ early decisions were not highly distressing to Jeffersonian

33. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (U.S. 1776).
34. Orth, supra note 32, at 1249.
35. See Harry T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining “Good Behavior” for Federal
Judges, 87 MICH. L. REV. 765, 776–78 (1989).
36. BRUTUS, BRUTUS XI (1788).
37. See Showcase Panel II: Judicial Tenure: Life Tenure or Fixed Non-Renewable Terms?, 12 BARRY L.
REV. 173, 191 (2009) (“Antifederalists . . . were opposed to life tenure in the first place.”).
38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
39. Two, four, or six years, depending on the office.
40. Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered,
29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 778 (2006).
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Republicans.41 However, with a relatively high rate of turnover in the federal
judiciary, subsequent presidents and senates had more opportunities to nominate
and confirm judges, thereby limiting the relative power and influence of any one
judge.42
Today, however, things are significantly different. The average tenure of
Supreme Court justices retiring between 1971 and 2006 was 26.1 years.43 This
drastic increase in length of tenure, due in large part to improved life
expectancy,44 increases the power vested in any one judge, especially at the
Supreme Court level. Brutus’s concern seems far more plausible if justices have
not just years, but decades to “mould the government.” In fact, contemporary
commentators relay his same concerns when they discuss President Trump’s
“reshaping [of] the federal judiciary.”45 It is a small wonder, then, that the
confirmation process has become more partisan. If a judicial nominee, especially
for the Supreme Court, is slated to stay on the bench for over two decades, it is
not surprising that members of the political branches should be primarily
concerned with how that nominee might rule in cases that directly affect the
major political and social issues of the day.
Given the choice between the shortened terms characteristic of the average
justice in the early Republic and the even shorter terms served by members of
congress or the president, Hamilton’s argument wins out over that of Brutus.
However, given the decades-long tenures that are characteristic of today’s
justices, the case for a middle ground seems stronger still. As Justice Kagan has
cautiously suggested, a constitutional amendment providing for a modest
reduction in judicial tenure may “take some of the high stakes out of the
confirmation process.”46 At the same time, a limit on tenure that cuts too short
may result in a sort of revolving door between the Supreme Court and private
actors, which could be damaging to the Court’s legitimacy as an institution.
While the Court’s current approval rating of fifty-four percent is not historically

41. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson, former President of the United States, to Spencer Roane,
Judge, Va. Court of Appeals (Mar. 9, 1821), http://tjrs.monticello.org/letter/1557 (“The great object of my fear
is the federal judiciary.”).
42. Abhinav Chandrachud, Does Life Tenure Make Judges More Independent? A Comparative Study of
Judicial Appointments in India, 28 CONN. J. INT’L L. 297, 302 (2013) (“[S]hortening the tenure of a constitutional
court judge reduces the amount of time he has to be able to make a difference—making judicial actors less
threatening to political powers.”).
43. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 40, at 778.
44. See Daniel J. Meador, Restructuring the Supreme Court: Regularizing Appointments, Providing More
Frequent Rotation, Avoiding Physical and Mental Impairment, 25 J.L. & POL. 459, 461 (2009) (“Life expectancy
is now 78 years (up from 47 in the founding generation), and predicted to increase three months every year.”).
45. See Carrie Johnson, One Year in, Trump Has Kept a Major Campaign Promise: Reshaping the Federal
Judiciary, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 21, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/21/
579169772/one-year-in-trump-has-kept-a-major-promise-reshaping-the-federal-judiciary.
46. Justice Kagan on SCOTUS Term Limits: “Maybe,” C-SPAN (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.cspan.org/video/?c4757264/justice-kagan-scotus-term-limits-maybe.
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high,47 it is significantly higher than current presidential,48 as well as
congressional,49 approval ratings. It is important that the public continue to view
the Court as “a disinterested arbiter of the law,” rather than “a partisan
institution,”50 and a system in which justices serve short terms and then leave
the Court to either run for political office or take well-compensated positions in
the private sector may well have an adverse effect on the Court’s legitimacy.
Therefore, a successful amendment would strike the correct balance between
“high stakes” life tenure and, as Justice Stephen Breyer put it, “a term that is so
short that the person sitting there is thinking about his next job.”51 America need
not look far for inspiration; virtually every other country with a mature judiciary
system has adopted some form of restraint on judicial tenure.
II. THE COMPARATIVE RARITY OF LIFE TENURE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
Critics of life tenure tend to emphasize the extent to which it is a uniquely
American phenomenon. While it is not true, as some have asserted, that “[n]o
other democracy gives life tenure to judges on its version of the Supreme
Court,”52 it is helpful to understand the United States’ practice in relation to other
judicial systems’ in order to appreciate its rarity.
First, one must clarify what constitutes a country’s “version of the Supreme
Court.” The Supreme Court of the United States is relatively consolidated in that
it has final say in appeals for all questions regarding the Constitution and federal
law.53 This is not unique, but it is worth noting that many other countries erect
constitutional courts separate from courts of general jurisdiction. For instance,
the Comoros divides judicial power between its Supreme Court54 and its
Constitutional Court.55 While judges of either court are technically “irremovable
from office,”56 Constitutional Court judges are limited in tenure to six-year

47. Supreme Court, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx (last visited Apr. 15,
2020
48. At the time of writing, President Trump’s approval rating is averaged at 44.4%. See How Popular is
Donald
Trump,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT,
https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/trump-approvalratings/?ex_cid=rrpromo (last updated Apr. 15, 2020, 10:06 AM).
49. At the time of writing, Congress’s approval rating is twenty-two percent. See Congress and the Public,
GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
50. Anthony J. Gaughan, The Case for Limiting Federal Criminal Jurisdiction over State and Local
Campaign Contributions, 65 ARK. L. REV. 587, 626 (2012).
51. Honorable Stephen Breyer, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Conversation at Association of American
Law
Schools
Annual
Meeting
(Mar.
28,
2016)
[hereinafter
Breyer
Conversation],
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjqKy8WOkP0&feature=youtu.be&t=3045.
52. Matthew Yglesias, No Other Democracy Gives Life Tenure to Judges on Its Version of the Supreme
Court, VOX (Feb. 16, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/2/16/11024096/life-tenure-judges.
53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
54. COMOROS CONSTITUTION, MAY 23, 2009, tit. 3, ch. 3, art. 29.
55. Id. tit. 6, art. 36.
56. Id. tit. 3, ch. 3, art. 28.

COSTELLO-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

May 2020]

5/10/20 3:45 PM

SUPREME COURT POLITICS

1163

terms,57 whereas Supreme Court judges are not subject to any restrictions on
tenure.58
A. THE PREVALENCE OF TENURE LIMITS FOR NON-CONSTITUTIONAL HIGH
COURTS
At present, there are at least seven countries, including other wellestablished democracies like Italy and France, that have adopted systems similar
to that of the Comoros, in which supreme court judges have life tenure and
constitutional court judges have limited tenure.59 In these countries, the rationale
for limiting judicial tenure for constitutional courts but not for non-constitutional
supreme courts is straightforward: in a democracy, a legislature can pass a
statute if it objects to the outcome of a particular supreme court decision, but
constitutional courts often have, “effectively, the last word in conflicts with
[legislatures].”60 Therefore, the prospect of putting a bad judge on a
constitutional court is more troublesome than a similarly situated nominee for a
supreme court, since the legislature may be powerless to remedy a bad decision.

57. Id. tit. 6, art. 38.
58. Id. tit. 3, ch. 3, art. 29.
59. Compare LA CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD PROMULGUEE LE 04 MAI 2018
[CONSTITUTION] May 4, 2018, tit. 6, ch 1, art. 160 (Chad), translated in CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
CHAD 27 (Maria del Carmen Gress &J.J. Ruchti trans., Library 2018) (“The members of the Supreme Court are
designated for a mandate of seven (7) years removable.”), with id., tit. 5, ch. 1, art. 154, translated in
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD, supra, at 28 (“The members of the Supreme Court are irremovable
during their mandate.”); compare Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of the
Czech Republic], ch. 6, art. 84, translated in Czech Republic 1993 (rev. 2013), CONSTITUTE,
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Czech_Republic_2013?lang=en (last visited Apr. 15, 2020)
(“The Constitutional Court shall be composed of fifteen Justices appointed for a period of ten years.”), with id.,
ch. 4, art. 93, translated in Czech Republic 1993 (rev. 2013), supra (“[Supreme Court] Judges are appointed to
their office for an unlimited term by the President of the Republic.”); compare 1958 CONST., tit. 7, art. 56 (Fr.),
translated in France 1958 (rev. 2008), CONSTITUTE, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
France_2008?lang=en (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) (“The Constitutional Council shall comprise nine members,
each of whom shall hold office for a non-renewable term of nine years.”), with id., tit. 8, art. 64, translated in
France 1958 (rev. 2008), supra (“Judges shall be irremovable from office.”); compare COSTITUZIONE [COST.],
tit. 6, § 1, art. 135 (It.), translated in Italy 1947 (rev. 2012), CONSTITUTE, https://www.constituteproject.org/
constitution/Italy_2012?lang=en (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) (“Judges of the Constitutional Court shall be
appointed for nine years . . . and they may not be re-appointed.”), with id., tit. 4, § 1, art. 107, translated in Italy
1947 (rev. 2012), supra (“Judges may not be removed from office.”); compare CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA
PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION] (1976), tit. 6, art. 222 (Port.), translated in Portugal 1976 (rev. 2005),
CONSTITUTE, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Portugal_2005?lang=en (last visited Apr. 15, 2020)
(“The term of office of judge of the Constitutional Court shall be nine years.”), with id. tit. 5, ch. 3, art. 216,
translated in Portugal 1976 (rev. 2005), supra (“[Supreme Court] Judges shall enjoy security of tenure and shall
not be transferred, suspended, retired or removed from office except in the cases laid down by law.”); compare
URADNI REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 27, 2003, ch. 8, art. 165 (Slovn.), translated in Slovenia
1991 (rev. 2016), CONSTITUTE, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Slovenia_2016?lang=en (last
visited Apr. 15, 2020) (“Constitutional Court judges are elected for a term of nine years. Constitutional Court
judges may not be re-elected.”), with id., ch. 4, art. 129, translated in Slovenia 1991 (rev. 2016), supra (“The
office of a [Supreme Court] judge is permanent.”).
60. Lech Garlicki, Constitutional Courts Versus Supreme Courts, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 44, 61 (2007).
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Accordingly, the system limits tenure for constitutional court judges as a means
of mitigating this risk.
When comparing the tenure of United States Supreme Court justices to
judges on other courts of last resort, other commentators have generally chosen
to emphasize the practices of courts “designed to pass on the constitutionality of
government actions” over those of non-constitutional supreme courts.61 This is
understandable, given the importance and relative finality of constitutional
decisions, as contrasted with the relative ease by which erroneous nonconstitutional decisions can be fixed by legislatures.62 This Note does not
challenge the use of constitutional courts in comparative analysis. Of course,
because the American judiciary is not structured along the same bifurcated lines
as the Comoros, a bifurcated approach to judicial tenure is not possible.
However, because the Supreme Court’s authority extends far beyond its
interpretation of solely Constitutional matters, it is worth mentioning that several
countries have adopted life tenure for high courts that pass on more general
issues.63
B. THE (EVEN GREATER) PREVALENCE OF TENURE LIMITS FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL HIGH COURTS
While the United States is not entirely alone in its practice of giving life
tenure to judges who have final say on constitutional questions, it is in rather
sparse company. At present, there are only four other countries that extend life
tenure to such judges.64 Additionally, as one learns by looking more closely, the
constitutional promise of life tenure does not necessarily guarantee to other
judiciaries the same level of judicial independence that one might associate with
the American system.
In practice, only two of the four judiciaries that afford life tenures have
practices analogous to that of the United States: Estonia and Luxembourg. The
Estonian judiciary has three levels of courts (county, circuit, and Supreme), and
all are governed by Chapter XIII of the Estonian Constitution.65 Chapter XIII,
Section 147 explicitly provides that “[j]udges are appointed for life” and “may
be removed from office only by a court judgment.”66
Luxembourg’s system is slightly different. Whereas Estonia, like the
United States, has but one court of last resort, Luxembourg, like Italy and
France, maintains a Constitutional Court distinct from its Superior Court of
61. See, e.g., Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 40, at 819 n.138.
62. See Garlicki, supra note 60, at 66.
63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
64. See Judge Selection and Term of Office: Countries Compared, NATIONMASTER,
https://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Government/Judicial-branch/Judge-selection-and-term-ofoffice (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
65. EESTI VABARIIGI PÕHISEADUS [CONSTITUTION] June 28, 1992, ch. 13, art 148 (Est.), translated in The
Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, RIIGITEATAJA, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/530102013003/
consolide (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
66. Id. ch. 13, art. 147.
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Justice.67 Unlike Italy and France, however, Luxembourg’s Constitution
explicitly provides that judges on either court are “irremovable” and “may only
be deprived of [their posts] or suspended . . . by a judgment.”68 Therefore,
Luxembourg takes on greater risk than its counterparts in extending the same
tenure to its Constitutional Court as it does to its Superior Court of Justice. It is
also worth noting that both Estonia and Luxembourg are member states of the
European Union and are thereby subject to the European Court of Justice (ECJ),
much as the several states are subject to judicial review by the United States
Supreme Court, and that the judges of the ECJ do not enjoy life tenure.69
However, for all national matters that fall outside the ECJ’s jurisdiction, both
countries have chosen to employ the American model of life tenure for judges.
The third country with life tenure is Oman. Its Basic Law, which functions
as the sultanate’s constitution, provides that judges “shall be irremovable except
in circumstances specified by the [Basic] Law.”70 However, as referenced in
Article 41, Oman is an absolute monarchy, rather than a democracy, and the
Sultan “is the head of State and the Supreme Commander of the Forces, his
person is inviolable, respect of him is a duty, and his command is obeyed.”71
Predictably, ultimate power over legal and constitutional matters lies with the
Sultan under such a system: Article 71 provides explicitly that all “[j]udgments
shall be rendered and enforced in the name of His Majesty the Sultan.”72
Practically, this has meant that while the courts retain nominal control over the
administration of the law, the Sultan can overturn judicial decisions if he so
chooses.73 This concentration of power in the executive is fundamentally at odds
with the American model of judicial independence, so while Oman may have
technically adopted life tenure for judges in its Basic Law, it cannot be said that
its judiciary is analogous to that of the United States.
The fourth country is Haiti, although it remains unclear whether Haitian
judges actually enjoy life tenure. The Haitian Constitution is inconsistent on the
matter. Article 174 of the Haitian Constitution provides: “Judges of the Supreme

67. CONSTITUTION, Oct. 17, 1868, ch. 6, art. 87, 95 (Lux.), translated in Luxembourg 1868 (rev. 2009),
CONSTITUTE, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Luxembourg_2009?lang=en (last visited Apr. 15,
2020).
68. Id. ch. 6, art. 91.
69. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 253, Oct. 26. 2012.
2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 158 (“The Judges . . . of the Court of Justice . . . shall be appointed by common accord of
the governments of the Member States for a term of six years.”).
70. BASIC LAW OF THE SULTANATE OF OMAN [CONSTITUTION] NOV. 6, 1996, ch. 6, art. 61, translated in
Royal Decree No. (101/96): Promulgating the Basic Statute by the State, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/om/om019en.pdf.
71. Id. ch. 4, art. 41.
72. Id. ch. 6, art. 71.
73. See Oman, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (2011), https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/
154470.htm (“The law provides for an independent judiciary; however, the sultan may act as a court of final
appeal and exercise his power of pardon as chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council.”).
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Court and Courts of Appeal are appointed for ten (10) years.”74 This seems to
be an unambiguous rejection of the American model of life tenure for judges. It
is odd, then, that Article 177 provides instead: “Judges of the Supreme Court,
the Courts of Appeal and the Courts of First Instance are appointed for life. They
may be removed from office only because of a legally determined abuse of
authority.”75 The two articles are obviously in contradiction, and it is unclear
from the structure of the document which article should control. To make
matters more confusing, in 2005, Boniface Alexandre, an interim president,
mandated the early retirement of five Supreme Court judges before any had
completed ten years of service.76 Therefore, even if the Haitian Constitution was
found to guarantee life tenure in Article 177, Haiti’s practice does not seem
analogous to that of the American judicial system.
Notwithstanding these four exceptions, every country in the world has
rejected the American model of life tenure for judges.77 Given the overwhelming
number of countries, one should consider whether the problems currently
associated with the American confirmation process could be mitigated by
reducing judicial tenure.
III. TWO APPROACHES TO LIMITS ON JUDICIAL TENURE
Fundamentally, there are two approaches to limiting life tenure for
justices.78 Either one would have to be implemented by a Twenty-Eighth
Amendment, rather than by statute, since Article III specifically provides for
“good behavior” tenure.79 The first proposal is a mandatory retirement age.80
The second involves limiting each justice’s tenure to one eighteen-year,
nonrenewable term. While there is a broad range of possible tenures, Justice
Kagan has called eighteen years “the going proposal,”81 and there is at least one
74. 1987 CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI, ch. 4, art. 174 (Haiti), translated Haiti 1987 (rev.
2012), CONSTITUTE, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012?lang=en (last visited Apr. 15,
2020).
75. Id. ch. 4, art. 177
76. INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, HAITI: FAILED
JUSTICE OR THE RULE OF LAW? CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR HAITI AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 15
(2006), http://cidh.org/countryrep/HAITI%20ENGLISH7X10%20FINAL.pdf.
77. See Judge Selection and Term of Office: Countries Compared, supra note 65 and accompanying text.
78. This Note does not consider more democratic approaches to limiting judicial tenure, such as elections.
It does so with the assumption that the American system values judicial independence, which is limited by
subjecting judges to elections. For a discussion on the antagonistic relationship between judicial independence
and judicial elections, see Shira J. Goodman et al., What’s More Important: Electing Judges or Judicial
Independence? It’s Time for Pennsylvania to Choose Judicial Independence, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 859, 860 (2010).
79. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
80. See Gabe Roth, Where John Ashcroft and Merrick Garland Meet, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 10,
2016), https://fixthecourt.com/2016/06/ftc-op-ed-on-a-mandatory-retirement-age-for-supreme-court-justices/
(advocating a mandatory retirement age of seventy for Supreme Court justices); see also Joel Cohen, Richard
A. Posner, and Jed S. Rakoff, Should There Be Age Limits for Federal Judges, SLATE (July 5, 2017, 5:11 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/07/should-there-be-age-limits-for-federal-judges.html (considering a
mandatory retirement age of eighty for federal judges).
81. See Justice Kagan on SCOTUS Term Limits: “Maybe,” supra note 46.
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proposal for an eighteen-year term limit that appears to have garnered some
traction.82 Furthermore, 18 years seems long enough to prevent the revolving
door concern to which Justice Breyer alluded.83 This Note considers the two
approaches in turn.
A. MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGE IN OTHER COMMON LAW COUNTRIES
At first glance, the mandatory retirement age approach makes particular
sense for the United States, given its common law heritage and the fact that the
United States adopted life tenure in large part because the English adopted such
a practice after the Glorious Revolution of 1688.84 That the British have since
adopted a mandatory retirement age, as have many other common law
countries,85 suggests that a mandatory retirement age might be a good fit for the
American system.
1.

Mandatory Retirement Age and Reduced Average Tenure in
Parliamentary Democracies
The argument in favor of mandatory retirement age reads like this: If we
know that a justice must retire at a given age, then there is a fixed upper limit on
that justice’s term.86 In theory, this will result in shorter terms for judges, and at
least amongst some parliamentary countries, there is some empirical evidence
that bears this out.
For instance, Australia, another common law country, has a mandatory
retirement age of seventy.87 In 2015, the average length of service for an
Australian High Court justice was about sixteen years,88 and given the High
Court’s current composition, the average tenure is expected to fall below twelve
years.89 The United States, having no mandatory retirement age and improving
life expectancy, has seen judicial tenure increase rather than decrease: By 2006,
the average length of tenure for Supreme Court justices had extended to over
twenty-six years.90 With Justice Kennedy’s recent departure from the Court

82. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 40, at 824.
83. See Breyer Conversation, supra note 51.
84. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 40, at 777.
85. Id. at 819–20.
86. Layne S. Keele, Why the Judicial Elections Debate Matters Less Than You Think: Retention as the
Cornerstone of Independence and Accountability, 47 AKRON L. REV. 375, 422 (2014) (“Judges who take office
a given number of years away from a mandatory retirement age have an effective, though not explicit, tenure
limit.”).
87. Australian Constitution s 51, ch. 3, art. 72 (“The appointment of a Justice of the High Court shall be
for a term expiring upon his attaining the age of seventy years, and a person shall not be appointed as a Justice
of the High Court if he has attained that age.”).
88. Brian Opeskin, Models of Judicial Tenure: Reconsidering Life Limits, Age Limits and Term Limits for
Judges, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 646 fig.3 (2015).
89. Alysia Blackham, Judges and Retirement Ages, 39 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 738, 772 (2016).
90. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 40, at 778.
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marking thirty years on the bench, a reduction in this trend of longer terms seems
unlikely.91
In addition to yielding shorter terms, Australia’s judicial selection process
also tends to produce substantially less controversy than its American
counterpart.92 Of course, this may have more to do with the broader structure of
Australia’s judicial selection process than with the length of judicial tenure.
Australia is governed under a parliamentary system. Officially, justices are
nominated by the Governor-General.93 This is something of a fiction, however;
in practice, the nominating power lies entirely with the government cabinet and,
ultimately, the Prime Minister.94 The Attorney General, who recommends a
nominee to the Governor-General, is technically required to consult with state
and territorial attorneys general before appointing justices,95 but ultimately,
unchecked authority lies with the government-in-power to fill any vacancies on
the Court.96 This is a material difference from the American system, wherein the
president’s nomination is only the beginning of the selection process.97
Therefore, one cannot easily attribute the relative absence of polarization
surrounding Australian High Court appointments to the mandatory retirement
age.
An additional difference bearing concern is that while the American
process of judicial selection may be too polarized, there are significant benefits
to providing a check on the presidential power of appointment. In the event that
a nominee is underqualified or holds views radically outside the jurisprudential
mainstream, it seems desirable to have that nominee vetted by the legislature. In
Australia, the Prime Minister’s cabinet does not have this constraint; it can
appoint anyone to the High Court without consulting the rest of Parliament.98 In
the past, this has enabled Prime Ministers to handpick like-minded politicians
for seats on the High Court.99 Consider the example of Sir John Latham. A
highly successful politician who served as Leader of the Opposition and Deputy
91. See Why Supreme Court Justices Serve Such Long Terms, ECONOMIST (July 4, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/07/04/why-supreme-court-justices-serve-such-longterms.
92. Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical
Perspectives From Around the World, 39 OTTAWA L. REV. 133, 138 (2007) (book review) (“If the United States
represents one extreme of judicial appointments in terms of negotiation and openness, the other extreme is surely
found in Australia.”).
93. High Court of Australia Act 1979 pt. 2 div. 1 s 6 (Cth).
94. George Williams, A Better Way to Choose Judges, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 14, 2009),
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/a-better-way-to-choose-judges-20090907-fe33.html.
95. See High Court of Australia Act 1979 pt. 2 div. 1 s 6 (Cth).
96. See Elizabeth Handsley & Andrew Lynch, Facing up to Diversity? Transparency and the Reform of
Commonwealth Judicial Appointments 2008-13, 37 SYDNEY L. REV. 187, 192 (2015) (“Beyond those very
minimal requirements, the manner of judicial appointment adopted by the Commonwealth Government at any
point in time is unconstrained.”).
97. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
98. See Handsley & Lynch, supra 96.
99. See, e.g., Fiona Wheeler, Sir John Latham’s Extra-Judicial Advising, 35 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 651,
651–53 (2011).
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Prime Minister in the Parliament,100 Latham was appointed Chief Justice of the
High Court by Prime Minister Joseph Lyons, a political ally of the same party.101
Throughout his tenure on the Court, he “clandestinely advised several
conservative political figures . . . on a range of controversial matters.”102 More
disturbingly, Latham is thought to have “secretly advised Prime Minister
Menzies on alterations to the Constitution to overcome the effect of the Court’s
ruling” in Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth, a case in which
Latham wrote the lone dissent.103
Of course, American presidents have also nominated political allies to the
Supreme Court as a means of changing the Court’s predisposition on a set of
issues, but at least in those instances, the nominees were subject to a process of
advice and consent before receiving their commissions.104 The United States and
Australia are both common law countries, but even a brief comparison of the
two judicial selection systems casts doubt as to whether it would be procedurally
possible or desirable for the United States to adopt anything resembling the
Australian system. Therefore, in order to more accurately predict the potential
impact of a mandatory retirement age on the American process, it is necessary
to find a system that bears a closer structural resemblance to the American
system.
2.

Lula’s Court: Brazil’s Problems with Mandatory Retirement Age

Brazil offers a system analogous to that of the United States.105 The
American influence on the Brazilian Constitution is well documented.106 This is
reflected in the process by which its Supreme Federal Court ministers are
appointed: ministers are nominated by Brazil’s President and confirmed by
Brazil’s Federal Senate.107 The ministers then serve until mandatory retirement
at age seventy-five.108
Despite these constitutional similarities, however, the Brazilian process of
judicial selection has not been subject to anything resembling the political strife
of its American counterpart. No one would suggest that the Brazilian system of
judicial selection is too charged or politically partisan; on the contrary, Brazilian
100. See id. at 654.
101. Id.; see also Kelvin Widdows, Sir John Latham: Judicial Reasoning in Defence of the Commonwealth,
2016 ABR 16, 42.
102. See Wheeler, supra note 99, at 652.
103. Id. at 652–53.
104. See, e.g., JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 89–99 (1989) (summarizing President Roosevelt’s political alliance with
Senator Hugo Black, as well as Roosevelt’s subsequent nomination of Black for the Supreme Court).
105. Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in the Americas in Comparative Perspective, 26 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994).
106. See generally Jacob Dolinger, The Influence of American Constitutional Law on the Brazilian Legal
System, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 803 (1990) (explaining that America had a substantial impact on Brazilian law).
107. CONSTITUIҪÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] ch. 2, s. 2, art. 84, cl. 14 (Braz.).
108. How Does Brazil’s Justice System Actually Work?, BRAZILIAN REP. (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://brazilian.report/guide-to-brazil/2017/10/16/brazils-justice-system-work.
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commentators have periodically voiced the opposite complaint.109 For instance,
Virgilío Alfonso da Silva, a constitutional law professor at the University of São
Paulo, who wishes that the Senate would take its role in the confirmation process
“more seriously,” contrasts the American confirmation process, which takes
“days,” with the Brazilian process, which takes “just an afternoon.”110 This
criticism is not ungrounded: the last time Brazil’s Senate rejected a nominee was
in 1894.111
This lackadaisical approach to judicial confirmations seems especially
concerning upon consideration of the disproportionate power that Brazil’s
mandatory retirement age can instill in certain presidents. Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva’s presidency is a good example of this problem. “Lula” served two terms
as Brazil’s president, holding office from 2003 to 2010.112 During that time,
seven ministers reached the mandatory retirement age of seventy-five, two
retired voluntarily, and one died.113 During his tenure, Lula successfully placed
eight ministers on the Supreme Court, and by the time he left office, six of the
eleven ministers, a majority, were his appointees.114 By contrast, the current
president-elect, Jair Bolsonaro, will only have two ministers reach the
mandatory age of retirement during his four-year tenure.115 To narrow the
difference, Bolsonaro has expressed a desire to pack the Court with 10 new
ministers, taking the Court’s size from eleven to twenty-one.116 Regardless of
whether Bolsonaro succeeds, the experience of Brazil indicates that this
disparity in appointment power vests certain presidents with an arbitrarily high
degree of control over the judiciary and ultimately makes the judiciary more
susceptible to political encroachment.
This is not to say that there have not been disparities amongst American
presidents with respect to judicial appointments.117 However, the size of the

109. Jurista Critica Sabatinas de Indicados ao STF, ESTADÃO (Sept. 28, 2009),
https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,jurista-critica-sabatinas-de-indicados-ao-stf,442224.
110. Id.
111. Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira & Nuno Garoupa, Choosing Judges in Brazil: Reassessing
Legal Transplants from the United States, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 529, 543 (2011).
112. Mauricio Savarese and Jenny Barchfield, Brazilian Police Question Ex-President in Corruption Probe,
CTV
NEWS,
https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/brazilian-police-question-ex-president-in-corruption-probe1.2803469 (last updated Mar. 4, 2016, 1:49 PM).
113. See Oliveira & Garoupa, supra note 111, at 542.
114. Id.
115. See
Ministros:
José
Celso
de
Mello
Filho,
SUPREMO
TRIBUNAL
FED.,
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/ministro/verMinistro.asp?periodo=stf&id=28 (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) (showing
that Minister Celso de Mello was born in 1945); see also Ministros: Marco Aurélio Mendes de Farias Mello,
SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FED., http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/ministro/verMinistro.asp?periodo=stf&id=30 (showing
that Minister Marco Aurélio was born in 1946).
116. See Maria Martha Bruno, The “Brazilian Donald Trump” Mimics Hugo Chávez in Supreme Court
Plans, BRAZILIAN REP. (July 5, 2018), https://brazilian.report/power/2018/07/05/jair-bolsonaro-trump-chavez.
117. For instance, President Carter never had the opportunity to appoint a candidate for the Supreme Court.
President Reagan, his successor, nominated four eventual justices—if one includes William Rehnquist, who
President Reagan elevated from Associate Justice to Chief Justice.
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disparity in Brazil, in part because of the mandatory retirement age, 118 is far
greater than any such disparity in recent American history.119 Therefore, while
one of the goals of a mandatory retirement age is to decrease the political stakes
of judicial appointments, it may actually end up further politicizing the
appointment process.
To illustrate this concern, consider the nomination of Merrick Garland.120
Senate Republicans refused to hold hearings for Garland in part to make the
Supreme Court a central issue in the 2016 election, effectively encouraging
Republican voter turnout.121 The plan worked, but it also had the consequence
of placing the Court directly in the crosshairs of the political branches.122
Furthermore, while there was only one seat in play for the 2016 election, it is
easy to imagine how perception of the Court might change if voters could know
that the next president would be responsible for filling a majority of the seats on
the Court, as was true in Lula’s case. In Brazil, the one-party rule that
characterized Lula’s term in office was enough to keep the judiciary relatively
removed from partisan battles. However, in a competitive political atmosphere,
such as that of the United States, this system could be disastrous for the judicial
confirmation process.
B. THE SUCCESS OF “TERM OF YEARS” TENURE LIMITS IN MEXICO
Mexico is the best case study for the “term of years” approach because its
constitutional structure for appointing judges is similar to that of the United
States. The Mexican Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN) has eleven
ministers, all of whom were nominated by the president and confirmed by the
Chamber of Senators, the higher body in Mexico’s bicameral legislature.123 This
structure, of course, is quite similar to its American counterpart. The primary
difference between the American system and the Mexican system lies in judicial
tenure. In practice, there are several facets in which Mexico’s confirmation
process, in practice, looks preferable to its American counterpart. At the same
time, however, its system also illustrates some shortcomings—also having to do
with disparities in appointment power—that the United States would do well to
avoid, should it adopt a “term of years” approach.

118. See Oliveira & Garoupa, supra note 111, at 542.
119. The largest disparity in the post-World War II period is between Dwight Eisenhower, who nominated
five Supreme Court justices, and Jimmy Carter, who did not nominate any. See Tom Murse, Which President
Has Nominated the Most Supreme Court Justices?, THOUGHTCO., https://www.thoughtco.com/who-nominatedmore-supreme-court-justices-3880107 (last updated July 3, 2019).
120. See Elving, supra note 24.
121. Id. (“[T]he vacancy became a powerful motivator for conservative voters in the [presidential
election] . . . . Many saw a vote for Trump as a means to keep Scalia’s seat away from the liberals.”).
122. Id.
123. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, Dario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], c.
4, art. 96, 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014 (Mex.).
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1. Mexico Adopts “Term of Years” Tenure Limits on SCJN Ministers
While Mexico’s confirmation process does not produce the sort of intense
partisan fighting that one finds with American confirmation battles,124 the
current process came into being in large part because its predecessor had come
under intense political scrutiny.125 Throughout the 1990s, commentators became
deeply critical of the executive branch’s overarching control of the judiciary.126
In response to this sort of concern, in 1994, Mexico overhauled its judiciary,
enacting a series of reforms designed to make it more independent.127 One of
these reforms was to institute fifteen-year “term of service” tenure limits for
Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation SCJN ministers.128 Another reform, also
aimed at untangling the judiciary from the political branches, was to prohibit the
president from nominating candidates who had held certain public offices in the
year prior to nomination.129 Ironically, after Mexico adopted these reforms in
the name of judicial independence, President Ernesto Zedillo, “dismissed” the
then-serving ministers of the SCJN and put up his own nominations for the
Court.130 Furthermore, because Zedillo’s political party, the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI), dominated every branch of the Mexican government
at the time, including the Senate, he was able to reshape the Court as he saw
fit.131 In the years after the 1994 overhaul, the Senate continued to be highly
deferential to the president’s nominees to the SCJN, in large part because of
single-party governance.132
2.

How Mexico Has Succeeded in Avoiding Partisan Confirmation
Battles
Today, the PRI no longer dominates Mexican politics as it did in the
nineties. Currently, it only has about 16 percent of the seats in the Mexican
Senate and no longer controls the presidency.133 Furthermore, the party currently
in charge, the National Regeneration Movement, controls less than 50 percent
124. Robert Kossick, The Rule of Law and Development in Mexico, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 715, 753
n.117 (2004) (“[T]he level of scrutiny received by Mexican Supreme Court nominees is nominal.”).
125. Alexis James Gilman, Making Amends with the Mexican Constitution: Reassessing the 1995 Judicial
Reforms and Considering Prospects for Further Reform, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 947, 956–60 (2003)
(summarizing Mexico’s constitutional amendments aimed at strengthening judicial independence).
126. See, e.g., Michael C. Taylor, Why No Rule of Law in Mexico? Explaining the Weakness of Mexico’s
Judicial Branch, 27 N.M. L. REV. 141, 147-48 (1997); see also Alicia Ely Yamin & Pilar Noriega Garcia, The
Absence of the Rule of Law in Mexico: Diagnosis and Implications for a Mexican Transition to Democracy,
21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 467, 491 (1999) (describing the judiciary as “subservien[t] to the executive
branch”).
127. Gilman, supra note 125.
128. Id. at 957.
129. Id.
130. Luke McGrath, Presumed Guilty?: Criminal Justice and Human Rights in Mexico, 24 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 801, 883 (2000).
131. Gilman, supra note 125, at 949–950.
132. Id.
133. Cómputos Distritales 2018, INSTITUTO NACIONAL ELECTORAL (July 8, 2018),
https://computos2018.ine.mx/#/senadurias/nacional/1/2/1/2 (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
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of the Senate seats and has had to forge a coalition with the Labor Party and
Social Encounter Party in order to secure control of the Senate.134 Despite the
increasingly pluralistic nature of Mexican politics, however, presidents tend to
have few problems getting their SCJN nominees confirmed. For instance,
Norma Lucía Piña Hernández, President Peña Nieto’s most recent SCJN
nominee, was confirmed overwhelmingly by a vote of seventy-nine to twenty,
despite intense opposition from some in the minority Labor Party.135 There are
three potential explanations for the Senate’s apparent willingness to confirm
nominees.
a.

Coalition Politics

The first explanation pertains to the Mexican Senate’s party demographics.
Because Mexican politics have become more pluralistic in the decades since the
reforms of 1994,136 presidents now have an incentive to consider factors beyond
judicial philosophy and political self-interest. Consequently, a president must
nominate candidates who appeal to senators from the various parties that
comprise the majority coalition.137 Historically, the United States has seen a
similar phenomenon at play when the presidency and Senate are controlled by
different political parties. For example, Anthony Kennedy, often labeled a
“moderate,”138 was nominated after the Senate rejected President Reagan’s first
Supreme Court nominee, Robert Bork, on the grounds that Bork was too
“conservative.”139 Kennedy’s nomination, then, can be understood as a sort of
compromise with Senate Democrats. This practice seems less applicable in the
current political climate, however. President Obama’s nomination of the
“center-left” Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court, for instance, struck many
as an attempt to compromise with a Republican Senate, since many regarded
Garland as a moderate jurist.140 As previously discussed, Garland’s nomination
did not end as President Obama had hoped.141 Given this most recent example
and the United States’ polarized and two-party political structure, it seems
134. Adam E. Badenhorst, Mexico’s Fragile Governing Coalition, MEDIUM (July 30, 2018),
https://medium.com/reformermag/mexicos-fragile-governing-coalition-b1dcc4bd4667.
135. Reed Brundage, Mexico Supreme Court: Senate Chooses Norma Piña as New Justice, MEX. VOICES
(Dec. 10, 2015), https://mexicovoices.blogspot.com/2015/12/mexico-supreme-court-senate-chooses.html.
136. See Ronald F. Wright, Mexican Drug Violence and Adversarial Experiments, N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 363, 379 (2010) (“The loss of the PRI monopoly on political power with the election of Vicente Fox
in 2000 signaled the arrival of a more pluralistic and democratically competitive nation.”).
137. See id.
138. See, e.g., Colin Dwyer, A Brief History of Anthony Kennedy’s Swing Vote—and the Landmark Cases
It Swayed, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 27, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/27/623943443/a-briefhistory-of-anthony-kennedys-swing-vote-and-the-landmark-cases-it-swayed.
139. See, e.g., Against Robert Bork; His Bill of Rights Is Different, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 1987),
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/05/opinion/against-robert-bork-his-bill-of-rights-is-different.html.
140. See, e.g., Nate Silver, Republicans Could Do a Lot Worse Than Merrick Garland Under President
Clinton—or
President
Trump,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Mar.
16,
2016,
3:42
PM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/republicans-could-do-a-lot-worse-than-merrick-garland-under-presidentclinton-or-president-trump.
141. See Howe, supra note 12.
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unlikely that the sort of broad, coalition-style nominations that play well in
Mexico will find much political success in the United States. It is certainly
conceivable that the nomination of a “moderate” candidate early in a president’s
term could be confirmed by a Senate controlled by an opposing party, but,
generally speaking, the president likely needs a friendly Senate in order to get
nominees confirmed.
b.

Jurisprudencia in Mexico’s Civil Law System

The second explanation, which is clearly inapplicable to the United States,
concerns the nature of judicial review in Mexico. In the United States, the
principle that lower courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s resolution of a
particular constitutional issue is fundamental.142 In Mexico, the SCJN’s
resolution of a particular dispute between two parties is, at least initially, only
binding upon the litigants before the Court.143 To create jurisprudencia in
Mexico (that is, to create precedent that binds all state and federal courts), eight
ministers of the SCJN must rule on a particular question of law and then uphold
the decision with “five consecutive and consistent decisions.”144 This
requirement of five consecutive and consistent decisions constitutes one of the
starker differences between the function of the United States Supreme Court and
Mexico’s SCJN. It also likely contributes to the comparatively relaxed approach
that the Mexican Senate takes with respect to the president’s SCJN nominations.
As an illustrative example, consider the permissibility of recreational
cannabis as a legal and political issue. In October 2018, the SCJN issued two
rulings that recognized cannabis use as part of the “fundamental right to the free
development of personality” guaranteed by the Mexican Constitution.145
However, the issue of recreational cannabis had been litigated before the SCJN
for years prior to these rulings.146 2015 marked the first time that the Court
invalidated a cannabis prohibition on constitutional grounds.147 On first glance,
it is not at all clear that there was any social consensus that cannabis

142. Winslow v. F.E.R.C., 587 F.3d 1133, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Vertical stare decisis—both in letter and
in spirit—is a critical aspect of our hierarchical Judiciary headed by ‘one supreme Court.’”).
143. See Patrick Del Duca, The Rule of Law: Mexico’s Approach to Expropriation Disputes in the Face of
Investment Globalization, 51 UCLA L. REV. 35, 101–02 (2003).
144. See Kossick, supra note 124, at 770 n.187.
145. See Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, Reitera Primera Sala Inconstitucionalidad De La
Prohibición Absoluta Del Consumo Recreativo De Marihuana E Integra Jurisprudencia (Oct. 31, 2018),
http://www.internet2.scjn.gob.mx/red2/comunicados/noticia.asp?id=5785; see also Christopher Ingraham,
Mexico’s Supreme Court Overturns Country’s Ban on Recreational Marijuana, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2018,
12:04
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/01/mexicos-supreme-court-overturnscountrys-recreational-marijuana-ban/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a7437b5dc8b2.
146. See, e.g., Carrie Kahn, Mexico’s Supreme Court Ruling Paves Way for Precedent on Marijuana
Legalization, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 5, 2015, 4:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/2015/11/05/454907637/
mexicos-supreme-court-ruling-paves-way-for-precedent-on-marijuana-legalization.
147. Elisabeth Malkin & Azam Ahmed, Ruling in Mexico Sets Into Motion Legal Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/world/americas/mexico-supreme-court-marijuanaruling.html.
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decriminalization was sound policy,148 much less a legal consensus that the
Mexican Constitution contained a fundamental right to use cannabis for
recreational purposes. There were at least some, including political leaders,149
religious readers,150 and advocacy groups, like the National Union of Parents,151
for whom the prospect of SCJN ministers invalidating criminal prohibitions on
cannabis was troubling. Interestingly, however, the two ministers who delivered
the opinions creating jurisprudencia on this issue were confirmed by large
margins in the Senate. The first was Norma Lucía Piña Hernández, who, as
previously mentioned, was confirmed with 79 votes in the Senate.152 The second,
Minister Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea, was nominated in 2009 and received
90 votes in the Senate.153 To the degree that the five-decision restriction limits
the SCJN’s capacity to set binding precedent with national public policy
implications, it makes sense that the stakes for each SCJN nominee are lower
than they might be in absence of the restriction.
Contrast Mexico’s jurisprudencia with judicial review in the United States.
The U.S. Supreme Court, like the SCJN, also passes on legal issues that have
national policy ramifications.154 The difference between the two is that the
Supreme Court’s decisions are binding, regardless of whether the Court is
considering an issue for the first time or reaffirming a centuries-old principle.155
In certain cases, the justices have been quite candid in acknowledging the ease
with which the Supreme Court can overrule precedent, as well as the ways in
which this reality can impact the politics of judicial selection.156 The Mexican
148. See, e.g., Vanda Felbab-Brown, Why Legalization in Mexico Is Not a Panacea for Reducing Violence
and Suppressing Organized Crime, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Sept. 23, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/
opinions/why-legalization-in-mexico-is-not-a-panacea-for-reducing-violence-and-suppressing-organizedcrime (“[T]here are good reasons not to want the very bloody Mexican capos to become legitimized.”).
149. See Malka Levitin, Mexican Supreme Court Inches Toward Marijuana Legalization,
COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L., http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/jtl/mexican-supreme-court-inches-towardmarijuana-legalization/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) (“The president of Mexico, Enrique Pena Nieto, is still
opposed to the legalization of marijuana, as are many politicians.”).
150. See, e.g., David Agren, Mexico Supreme Court Rules Ban on Marijuana Use Unconstitutional,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2015, 5:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/04/mexico-supreme-courtrecreational-marijuana-legal (discussing the Archdiocese of Mexico City’s opposition to the SCJN’s decision to
remove the legalization debate from the legislature, “as if it’s a super power.”).
151. See Dudley Althaus, Mexico’s Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Personal Marijuana Use, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 4, 2015, 5:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mexicos-supreme-court-rules-in-favor-of-personalmarijuana-use-1446670474?alg=y (“This issue should be decided by Congress.”).
152. See Brundage, supra note 135.
153. Claudia Guerrero & Rolando Herrera, Avala el Senado Relevos en la Corte; Obtienen Respaldo del
PRI, PAN y PRD. Sustituye Zaldívar a Genaro Góngora y Aguilar a Azuela en el Poder Judicial, EL NORTE
(Dec. 2, 2009).
154. See Eric Black, How the Supreme Court Has Come to Play a Policymaking Role, MINNPOST (Nov. 20,
2012), https://www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2012/11/how-supreme-court-has-come-play-policymakingrole.
155. See, e.g., Alshrafi v. Am. Airlines, 321 F. Supp. 2d 150, 156 n.7 (D. Mass. 2004) (“The sweeping
nature of recent Supreme Court preemption jurisprudence has been the subject of considerable comment, much
of it critical. . . . Still, it is bedrock that Supreme Court decisions bind the analysis of [lower courts].”).
156. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883, 943 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part)
(“In one sense, the Court’s approach is worlds apart from that of [the dissent] . . . . And yet, in another sense,
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approach to jurisprudencia, like the coalition-style politics that currently
dominate the Mexican Senate, finds no resonating parallel in the United States.
c.

Fifteen-Year SCJN Terms: A Model for the United States?

A third explanation, which is most easily applicable to the United States
and most pertinent to the topic of this Note, is that the stakes of each particular
nomination are lower when there is a fixed tenure ceiling for each nominee. As
mentioned previously, the average length of tenure for a Supreme Court Justice
in the modern era is in excess of twenty-six years.157 This aggravates already
existing partisan attitudes about the Supreme Court in two ways. First, the
twenty-six-year average creates high stakes for nominations simply by virtue of
its length. A confirmation vote is an important decision that senators make with
imperfect information about the nominee,158 and the stakes are higher than if the
nominee were slated to sit on the Court for a shorter period of time than a likely
twenty-six years.
Second, and perhaps more dangerous, is the uncertainty that comes with
“good behavior” tenure. Given the Supreme Court’s increasingly central role in
deciding issues of public policy,159 the public has taken a strong interest in the
composition of the Court.160 While this is certainly understandable, it has also
given rise to a curious and even disturbing infatuation with the mortality of the
Court’s members.161 Almost inevitably, each summer brings with it a series of
rumors and speculation concerning the possible retirement of at least one elderly
justice, lest he or she die in office and be replaced by a president with differing
opinions about the law, thereby shifting the ideological balance of the Court.162

the distance between the two approaches is short—the distance is but a single vote. . . . I cannot remain on this
Court forever, and when I do step down, the confirmation process for my successor may well focus on the issue
[of abortion].”).
157. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 40, at 778.
158. Oliver Roeder, Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings Have More Questions and Fewer Answers Than
Ever Before, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 4, 2018, 5:58 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/supreme-courtconfirmation-hearings-have-more-questions-and-fewer-answers-than-ever-before (“[Supreme Court] nominees
have nearly perfected the sport of confirmation-hearing dodgeball, ducking and weaving through the thousands
of comments.”).
159. See Black, supra note 154.
160. See Voter Enthusiasm at Record High in Nationalized Midterm Environment, supra note 27.
161. See, e.g., Oliver Roeder, How Long Will the Supreme Court’s Conservative Bloc Survive?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 19, 2018, 5:59 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-long-will-the-supremecourts-conservative-bloc-survive/; see also SCOTUS DEATHWATCH, http://scotusdeathwatch.com/ (last visited
Apr. 15, 2020); see also Chris Kirk & Stephen Laniel, The Supreme Court Justice Death Calculator, SLATE
(Jan. 14, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/01/
supreme_court_justice_death_calculator_find_out_the_probabilities_that_different.html.
162. See, e.g., Melissa Quinn, Mike Lee: “Very Real Possibility” Justice Antony Kennedy Retires This Year,
WASH. EXAMINER (May 23, 2018, 10:21 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/courts/
mike-lee-very-real-possibility-justice-anthony-kennedy-retires-this-year (“[H]e considers himself a Republican,
and with all things being equal, would prefer to be replaced by a Republican president.”); see also Jonathan
Turley, Opinion: Ginsburg Gambled to Stay and Now She May Lose Her Legacy, HILL (Apr. 10, 2017, 4:00
PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/328151-ginsburg-gambled-to-stay-on-the-supreme-

COSTELLO-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

May 2020]

5/10/20 3:45 PM

SUPREME COURT POLITICS

1177

The annual fixation with who might leave the Court and what impact that would
have on its balance regularly drums up partisan attitudes about the judiciary.163
It tends not to help that the end of the term, which is when this morbid
speculation reaches its peak intensity, also happens to coincide with the release
of the Court’s “most important” decisions for the term.164
Mexico does not have this annual uncertainty because the ministers of the
SCJN have fixed terms. It may well be true that not every minister serves his or
her fifteen years to completion. However, one of the purported benefits of
establishing fifteen-year terms was greater predictability in the composition and
turnover of the SCJN.165 From 1947 to 1994, for instance, Mexico did not
employ the “term of years” approach it currently uses; rather, it employed a
mandatory retirement age of seventy.166 Because of the wide availability of
attractive non-judicial positions in the government, fifty-five percent of SCJN
ministers left the bench after serving ten years or less.167 Some commentators
thought that the fifteen-year terms instituted in 1994 would result in more
ministers completing the term of service, thereby instituting a more spread-out,
consistent rate of turnover.168 A chaotic, uneven rate of turnover, by contrast,
seems to inherently produce uncertainty. Granted, in pre-1994 Mexico, this
uncertainty did not result in particularly high stakes for judicial selection, since
the likelihood of a minister remaining on the SCJN for decades was
comparatively low.169 In the United States, however, the opposite is true.
Because turnover is not easily predictable and because terms are so long, the
political stakes of each nomination are high. Since no one knows when another
vacancy on the Court will open, presidents and senators feel a great deal of
pressure to treat vacancies as important political battles. A set term of years
would help resolve this uncertainty in large part.

court-now-she-may (“What began as polite suggestions that it ‘might be time [for Justice Ginsburg] to leave’
became more and more pointed, if not panicked, in the last two years of the Obama term.”).
163. See, e.g., Janice Williams, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Retirement Rumors Has
Washington on Edge for Next Term, NEWSWEEK (June 24, 2017, 12:47 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/
anthony-kennedy-supreme-court-retirement-628842; see also Tony Mauro, Rehnquist Retirement Rumors Flare
Up and Go Out Again; Courtside, RECORDER (June 10, 2002), at 3 (“The story [that Justice Rehnquist was going
to retire] was whipping around Washington, feeding on itself, and you could almost hear interest groups dusting
off their battle gear for a confirmation battle.”).
164. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: The End of the Term, SCOTUSBLOG (June 18, 2016,
9:17 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/scotus-for-law-students-the-end-of-the-term/.
165. Héctor Fix-Fierro, Judicial Reform and the Supreme Court of Mexico: The Trajectory of Three Years,
6 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 1, 6 n.28 (1998).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. HÉCTOR FIX-ZAMUDIO & JOSÉ RAMÓN COSSÍO DÍAZ, EL PODER JUDICIAL EN EL ORDENAMIENTO
MEXICANO 630–33 (1996).
169. Fix-Fierro, supra note 165, at 6 n.28.
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The Need for Staggered Terms: Lessons from Mexico’s Disparities in
Presidential Appointment Power

Having identified one positive aspect of Mexico’s judicial selection
process that would be applicable in the United States (by way of a TwentyEighth Amendment), it is also worth noting that the “term of years” approach
may help to alleviate some of the partisanship now inherent in the process.
Unfortunately, this solution could also have the undesired effect of producing
large disparities in nominating power for subsequent presidents, which is part of
what makes the Brazilian model so undesirable.170 A brief examination of the
current composition of the SCJN makes this problem more apparent.
Because President Zedillo nominated a wave of ministers at once in
1994,171 each minister’s tenure was set to the same term-of-years clock, so to
speak. Theoretically, this would mean that Zedillo and the president who serves
fifteen years after Zedillo would each have the opportunity to fill the entire
composition of the Court, with no intermediate vacancies for other presidents to
fill (assuming each minister serves the entire fifteen-year term). Fortunately, this
has not been the case, as not every minister has served the full term.172 However,
the appointment disparity is borne out by the current SCJN, which contains 5
ministers nominated by Filipe Calderón,173 who served from 2006 to 2012,174
and only three ministers by Enrique Peña Nieto,175 the following president,
whose term ran from 2012 to 2018.176 By contrast, the current president, Andrés
Manuel López Obrador, whose term will be six years,177 will have the
opportunity to nominate ministers for at least six vacancies178: as of November
2019, he had already appointed two ministers,179 one minister had resigned,180
and three of the current ministers, Fernando Franco González-Salas,181 Arturo

170. Oliveira & Garoupa, supra note 111, at 542–43.
171. McGrath, supra note 130, at 883.
172. See, e.g., All Power: López Obrador’s Attempts to Seize the Supreme Court, CE NOTICIAS FINANCIERAS
ENGLISH (Oct. 4, 2019) (describing Eduardo Medina-Mora’s resignation from the SCJN).
173. See Conoce la Corte, SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN, https://www.scjn.gob.mx/conocela-corte (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
174. See List of Presidents of Mexico, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/listof-presidents-of-Mexico-1830608 (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
175. See Conoce la Corte, supra note 173.
176. See List of Presidents of Mexico, supra note 174.
177. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, Dario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], c.
4, art. 83, 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014 (Mex.).
178. This assumes that all present ministers serve out their full terms.
179. See Juan Luis González Alcántara Carrancá Is Welcomed at the SCJN, CE NOTICIAS FINANCIERAS
ENGLISH (Jan. 2, 2019).
180. See All Power: López Obrador’s Attempts to Seize the Supreme Court, supra note 172.
181. See SCJN: Why It Anticipates That It Will Be a Woman to Replace Medina Mora, CE NOTICIAS
FINANCIERAS ENGLISH (Oct. 4, 2019) (“[T]he ministers are elected to a 15-year commission, so the next outing
would be that of José Fernando Franco González-Salas, nominated by Vicente Fox in December 2006.”).
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Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea,182 and Luis María Aguilar Morales,183 will each hit their
fifteen-year limits before López Albrador’s term expires in 2024. Certainly, this
is less dramatic than the disparities present in the Brazilian judicial selection.184
However, if the goal is to reduce the levels of partisanship and political strife
that currently infect the process, the ideal solution should allocate opportunities
for presidents to nominate candidates on a roughly equal basis.
The problem of disparity in nominating power would perhaps best be
addressed by staggering the fixed terms at the outset. This illustrates an
important strength of the approach advanced by Professors Steven Calabresi and
James Lindgren.185 The Calabresi-Lindgren model proposes eighteen-year terms
with appointments staggered every two years.186 This has two positive effects.
First, it guards against disparity in nominating power by granting each president
the opportunity to nominate at least two candidates to the Supreme Court per
term. If a president wins two terms in office, then the president will have four
opportunities to nominate a candidate. Therefore, while a one-term president
will have half as many opportunities to fill vacancies as a two-term president,
this will solely be a reflection of the president’s extended time in office,
reflecting public support. This is to be contrasted with the Brazilian and Mexican
systems—as well as, to a certain degree, the current American system—in which
the president’s influence on the high court is determined by more arbitrary
factors, such as the death or retirement of a sitting member. Furthermore, in the
event of a premature end to a justice’s tenure, be it death or early retirement, the
Calabresi-Lindgren approach affords presidents the opportunity to make an
interim nomination, also subject to advice and consent of the Senate.187
Therefore, while some presidents will have slight advantages in nominating
power over others, the advantage is limited to the remainder of the original
eighteen-year term, and importantly, no president will be denied the opportunity
to fill at least two full vacancies.
Second, it reduces the political pressure to select (or block) nominees on
strictly ideological grounds. Of course, the Senate should not be unduly
deferential towards the president’s nominations in any instance, and it would be
a dereliction of the Senate’s duty if it simply rubber-stamped nominees who
lacked sufficient credentials, held ideas far outside the mainstream, or exhibited
serious character flaws. However, any purely partisan confirmations would
likely be offset over time, assuming at least some change in party control of the
White House and the Senate. The hope, then, is that the participants in the
182. See Ministros Eligen Hoy a Presidente de la Suprema Corte, EXCELSIOR (Feb. 1, 2019, 8 :31 PM),
https://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/ministros-eligen-hoy-a-presidente-de-la-suprema-corte/1287982 (“Su
periodo finaliza el 30 de noviembre de 2024,” which translates to “Its period ends on November 30, 2024.”).
183. See The New Minister of the Court will be Decisive to Choose the Head of the PJF, CE NOTICIAS
FINANCIERAS ENGLISH (Aug. 26, 2018) (“[Aguilar Morales’s] term as minister ends [in] 2024.”).
184. See Oliveira & Garoupa, supra note 111, at 542.
185. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 40, at 824.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 827.
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confirmation process place greater emphasis on each nominee’s competence to
serve on the Court and less emphasis on political gamesmanship.
CONCLUSION
It would be naïve to reduce any existing problems with judicial selection
to a single factor or to argue that a modest alteration to the process would remove
partisanship from the nomination and confirmation process. As acknowledged
from the outset, politics have always crept into the confirmation process. That
said, there are degrees of politicization, and when the process becomes as toxic
and divisive as it has in recent years in the United States, the underlying causes
ought to be addressed.
There is some reason to think that the current practice of life tenure is a
contributing factor to the current climate in the judicial selection process.
Decades-long terms with no fixed end date incentivizes political actors to treat
Supreme Court vacancies as political contests. This is not a strictly theoretical
point. Just as other nations have largely abandoned the practice of life tenure,
they have also, in many instances, avoided the toxic partisanship that surrounds
the judicial selection process in the United States. While a number of structural
and political factors account for the difference, the experiences of other countries
tend to suggest that a modest reduction in judicial tenure would have some
positive effects. The Brazilian experience with mandatory retirement cautions
against a mandatory retirement age, but the Mexican experience with a fixed
term of years is encouraging. Given these observations, the United States would
do well to consider a Twenty-Eighth Amendment that restricted Supreme Court
tenure to eighteen years. Mexico is also illustrative of the discrepancies in
appointment power that can result from a term of years system. To account for
this, the terms ought to be staggered every two years, thereby guaranteeing each
president two complete vacancies and the possibility of one or more interim
vacancies.

